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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps nothing is more akin to our innermost secrets than the
content of our private conversations.1  Conversational content,
though, is no longer fleeting—millions of Americans use e-mail as a
central medium of communication, their conversations preserved on
the servers of internet service providers (ISPs).2  Consider the con-
tents of a typical e-mail account: It often contains e-mails to family,
friends, and lovers with pictures, receipts, and appointments, and its
contents may date back days or possibly even years.  Also consider
how invasive it would be if a police officer had unfettered access to
that e-mail account and rifled through each and every stored e-mail
and file.
The framers of our Constitution “sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations” and
“conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone.”3  The
laws that govern government access to our private lives impose checks
and balances on the power of the police to search and seize private
information, protecting us from invasions of privacy unless an intru-
sion is justified by factual circumstance.  When police investigate a
crime and want to search for evidence, they must—in order to first
obtain a search warrant—convince a magistrate judge that the facts
known establish there is probable cause to believe a search will un-
cover evidence of wrongdoing.4  However, a warrant based upon prob-
able cause is not the only thing required for a search and seizure to be
considered constitutional—the Fourth Amendment categorically pro-
hibits the issuance of warrants except those particularly describing
both the place to be searched and the things to be seized.5  According
to the Supreme Court:
The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general
searches.  By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and
1. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) (referring to conversation as “the
innermost secrets of one’s home or office . . .”); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679,
686 (10th Cir. 1971) (“[A] search for property is a different and less traumatic
invasion than is the quest for private conversations.”).
2. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1423 (2009).  An ISP owns points on a network between a user’s computer
and the rest of the internet. Id.  Its principal role is to route internet traffic by
receiving communications from its users and sending them to the rest of the
world, and vice versa, over cables between its facilities and the premises of its
users. Id.  All of a user’s communications must pass through an ISP. Id.
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB401.txt unknown Seq: 3  1-MAY-12 11:20
2012] WHEN RUMMAGING GOES DIGITAL 973
things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures
that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take
on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the [f]ramers in-
tended to prohibit.6
However, the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects the
content of stored e-mail communications is an open question—a new
frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been little ex-
plored.7  Many have addressed the issues surrounding probable cause
and stored e-mail surveillance,8 yet neither Congress nor courts or
scholars have addressed how the particularity requirement should ap-
ply in this context.  Simply stated, how warrants authorizing stored e-
mail surveillance describe with particularity both the place to be
searched and the things to be seized has been greatly overlooked.
A central purpose served by the particularity requirement is the
prevention of “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belong-
ings.”9  The potential for such boundless rummaging is significantly
magnified in the internet age, as one’s private, digital conversations so
infrequently remain within the periphery of one’s own control.10  Con-
gress has codified procedural protections derived from the particular-
ity requirement11 that protect privacy and curtail abuse for some
forms of electronic surveillance, especially when such surveillance di-
vulges a wide range of private information over a significant period of
6. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
7. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2008),
rev’d and remanded by City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
8. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored
E-Mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 175–76 (2008) (advocating for probable-cause
based warrants for all stored communications); Orin Kerr, Applying the Fourth
Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1041–44
(2010) (arguing that permitting the government to obtain stored communications
without probable cause is unconstitutional); Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause:
The Diminishing Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514,
1516 (2010) (discussing the application of probable cause and other justification
standards online); Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1299 (2004) (arguing that “for most uses of elec-
tronic surveillance, warrants supported by probable cause should be required”).
9. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
10. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[T]he
broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy
which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth
Amendment safeguards.”).
11. See, e.g., Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2518(1)–(5) (2006 & Supp. III
2009); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58–60 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 355–56 (1967); see also Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communica-
tions Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 54 (2007) (“[W]e want to make clear
our view that a warrant for television surveillance that did not satisfy the four
provisions of [the Wiretap Act] that implement the Fourth Amendment’s require-
ment of particularity would violate the Fourth Amendment.” (citing United
States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883–85 (7th Cir. 1984))).
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time.12  However, the statutory laws governing the surveillance of
stored e-mails and files do not contain these same protections.
The privacy invasions that result when particularity is lacking in
the context of stored e-mails and files are best demonstrated by exam-
ple.  Imagine that Bob is the sole owner of a company that markets
and sells its products through telephone orders, online sites, and retail
stores.  Bob’s customers, however, are angry.  They file a criminal
complaint against Bob and his company, claiming the products they
purchased do not work as advertised and their money-back guaran-
tees have not been honored.  The government then starts investigat-
ing Bob and his company in connection with the marketing and sale of
the products, trying to find violations of federal law, such as mail
fraud or money laundering.
Bob has an e-mail account through which both his professional and
personal e-mails are stored on a server, owned and operated by his
ISP.  The government wants to know if these e-mails contain leads or
evidence, so it obtains a court order under the Stored Communications
Act (SCA)13 to compel the ISP to divulge the e-mails.  Pursuant to the
SCA, the court order grants government access to Bob’s e-mail sub-
scriber information and the contents14 of all Bob’s e-mails that have
been in storage for more than 180 days.15  The ISP divulges the e-
mails to the government—every e-mail more than 180 days old from
the time Bob first opened his e-mail account—except e-mails that Bob
did not access, view, or download.  The government examines
thousands of these e-mails, many of which are deeply personal and
completely unrelated to Bob’s business, having no relevance to the
government’s investigation.  As permitted under the SCA, moreover,
the ISP is forbidden from notifying Bob the government has gained
access to his e-mails.16
Based on the information provided by the complaining customers,
the government knows specific information concerning when and how
12. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 58–60, 63–64 (invalidating a New York statute under the
Fourth Amendment because it authorized electronic eavesdropping without pro-
cedural safeguards); Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 (extending Fourth Amendment protec-
tions beyond physical intrusions); see also Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶¶ 53–54
(noting seven federal appellate courts hold the Fourth Amendment regulates si-
lent video surveillance in the same heightened manner as wiretapping).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711.
14. Id. § 2703(c)(2).  As to e-mail subscriber information, the government may compel
an ISP to disclose the name, address, length of service (including start date and
types of service utilized), subscriber number or identity (including e-mail ad-
dresses and IP addresses), and means or source of payment for service (including
any credit card or bank account number). Id.  “Content” of is defined as “any
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communica-
tion.” Id. § 2510(8).
15. Id. § 2703(a)–(d).
16. Id. § 2705.
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the alleged federal offenses occurred.  Yet the government never es-
tablishes probable cause to believe the search of Bob’s stored e-mails
will yield evidence of a crime, and it never obtains a warrant or at-
tempts to limit its search to e-mails pertaining concerning only Bob’s
business.  Nor does it limit its search and seizure to e-mails sent or
received during the time period when the alleged federal offenses oc-
curred.  The government does not do any of these things, even though
it could, because the SCA does not require it to do so.17  Is it possible
the government can search and seize thousands of Bob’s personal, pri-
vate e-mails which have no relevance to its investigation?  Yes, it is
possible.  In fact, the scenario just described is similar to what hap-
pened to Steven Warshak in 2005.18  Such government surveillance
unreasonably intrudes into our online personal privacy and dignity.
This stems from the failure of the courts to, until recently, extend the
Fourth Amendment’s protections to e-mail communications.19
To date, most of the discussion regarding how the Constitution pro-
tects privacy interests in stored e-mail has focused on whether a war-
rant is required to conduct stored e-mail surveillance and whether
probable cause is the appropriate justification standard .20  Little to
no attention has been directed toward how the particularity require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures of
stored e-mail communications.21  Only Susan Freiwald has argued
that procedural particularity should be required in order for govern-
ment acquisitions of stored e-mails to pass constitutional muster, yet
she did not enumerate specific standards of particularity.22  This Arti-
cle addresses how the particularity requirement applies to stored e-
mail surveillance and sets forth standards to evaluate the particular-
ity of search warrants for stored e-mail communications.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II explains why and how
procedural protections derived from the particularity requirement
have been codified by Congress and imposed by the courts in order to
limit certain electronic-surveillance techniques.  Part III describes
how probable cause defines which stored e-mails the government may
17. Id. § 2703(b), (d) (describing the requirements to obtain an administrative sub-
poena and a “d-order” to compel disclosure of contents of stored e-mail,
respectively).
18. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010).
19. Id. at 288 (holding “to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government
to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional”).
20. See, e.g., Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 8, at 175–76; Solove, supra note 8, at
1299.
21. Courts have recognized and struggle with the uncertainty as to the precise appli-
cability of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement with respect to
searches and seizures of e-mail communications. See, e.g., United States v. Tay-
lor, 764 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233–35 (D. Me. 2011); United States v. Bowen, 689 F.
Supp. 2d 675, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
22. See Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶¶ 1–4.
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search and seize and the reason why scholarship has overemphasized
probable cause in the context of stored e-mail surveillance.  Then de-
scribed is how current statutory law governing stored e-mail surveil-
lance is in disharmony with the Fourth Amendment, and therefore
how it must be amended to require search warrants for stored e-mail
surveillance.  Part IV proposes concrete standards for determining
whether a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of stored e-mail
communications adheres to the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.  Finally, Part V addresses the practicalities of
the proposed particularity standards and responds to several potential
objections concerning the implementation of these standards.
II. EXTENDING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT—FROM
TELEPHONES TO E-MAIL
Great tension exists between privacy and security.23  The govern-
ment promotes security by investigating crimes.  In a digital world,
criminal investigations involve increasingly intrusive monitoring and
information gathering, which pose substantial threats to privacy.  In-
deed, there is a deep-seated unease and apprehension that the govern-
ment uses electronic surveillance “to intrude upon cherished privacy
of law-abiding citizens.”24  Between the governmental need to investi-
gate crimes and the societal need to protect personal privacy stands
the Fourth Amendment—the constitutional balancing factor.25  It
safeguards the privacy of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
the government.26
The government’s surveillance techniques and technologies are
constantly evolving to keep pace with revolutions in communication.
Interpretation of whether government surveillance is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment continually evolves in order to address
constitutional privacy concerns previously unforeseen.27  Long before
23. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“On one side of the
balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and per-
sonal security; on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal
with breaches of public order.”); United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W,
2009 WL 4728690, at *5 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (“With the advent of the computer
age, courts have struggled to balance privacy interests against law enforcement
interests.”).
24. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
25. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State.”).
26. Camera v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (“The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive
acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.”).
27. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress,
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the advent of e-mail, the telephone revolutionized communication by
exponentially increasing our ability to connect.  In response to this
new technology, recording and transmitting devices were invented,
thereby enabling the government to hear our telephone conversations
without detection.  When confronted with the constitutionality of
these new surveillance techniques, the Supreme Court held that wire-
tapping necessitated implementation of Fourth Amendment privacy
safeguards given the telephone’s vital role as a medium for communi-
cation28 as well as the private nature of telephone conversations.29
Seven federal appellate courts have used a similar rationale to extend
analogous protections concerning the government’s use of silent video
surveillance.30
These two methods of electronic surveillance share common char-
acteristics.  The surveillance is hidden—wiretaps and video cameras
go unseen and unnoticed by those under surveillance.31  The surveil-
lance is intrusive in that it captures the private conversations and ac-
tions of the investigation target, and it is indiscriminate in that it
“does not merely disclose the target’s incriminating information, but
also the target’s non-incriminating information as well as information
about those innocent parties.”32  Lastly, it is continuous because, in
comparison to a one-shot search, wiretapping and video surveillance
collect information over an extended period of time.33
Since the advent of e-mail, an explosion of internet-based commu-
nication has taken place, with telephone calls and postal mail waning
in importance.34  E-mail accounts generally contain thousands of
or its guarantees will wither and perish.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 34 (2001))); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Technol-
ogy is rapidly evolving and the concept of what is reasonable for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes will likewise have to evolve.”).
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
29. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58–60 (1967) (holding state’s electronic eaves-
dropping statute facially unconstitutional for lack of adequate Fourth Amend-
ment safeguards); Katz, 389 U.S. at 347 (finding a Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy in telephone calls made from a closed phone booth).
30. See Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶¶ 53–54.
31. Id. ¶ 53–54 & n.80 (citing United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir.
1984) (describing the use of television cameras in the homes of suspected ter-
rorists in 1983)).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that
video surveillance and recording conversations are invasions of privacy); Susan
Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56
ALA. L. REV. 9, 80 (2004).
33. Freiwald, supra note 32, at 80.
34. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Lauren
Reardon, Email Statistics Report, 2009–2013, THE RADICATI GRP., INC. (May 6,
2009), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/e-mail-statistics-
report-2009-pr.pdf (estimating there were 1.4 billion e-mail users worldwide and
47 billion non-spam e-mail messages sent daily in 2009).
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other messages among which the sought-after communication may be
stored or concealed.35  ISPs offer a variety of e-mail services to their
users, many of which are web-based accounts maintained by the
ISPs.36  E-mails sent, received, archived, and even deleted via such e-
mail accounts are often stored on the ISP’s mail servers for varying
lengths of time.37  Advances in government surveillance as well as in-
creasing data retention capabilities38 pose serious threats to individ-
ual privacy without procedural constraints.39
Surveillance of stored e-mail shares the same characteristics as
wiretapping and silent video surveillance and thus exhibits the same
constitutional infirmities.40  Stored e-mail surveillance is hidden in
several ways.41  ISPs are intermediaries between e-mail-account hold-
ers and the government—ISPs can access e-mails stored on their serv-
ers pursuant to a request by law enforcement without knowledge of
the account holder.42  The government may also specifically request
that ISPs delay notifying the account holder after the ISP has ac-
35. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284–85.
36. Some of the largest e-mail services offer users huge amounts of computer disk
space to warehouse their e-mails for perpetual storage.  For example, Google’s
“Gmail” service offers more than seven gigabytes of free storage space. How it
Works, GOOGLE.COM, http://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&ans
wer=39567 (last updated Oct. 4, 2011).  Google also encourages its users not to
throw messages away. Getting Started with Gmail, GOOGLE.COM, http://mail.
google.com/mail/help/intl/en/start.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (“Don’t waste
time deleting . . . . [T]he typical user can go years without deleting a single
message.”).
37. LEONARD DEUTCHMAN & SEAN MORGAN, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., THE
ECPA, ISPS & OBTAINING E-MAIL: A PRIMER FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS 10 (2005).
38. Recently, the Department of Justice renewed calls for legislation mandating a
minimum data retention period for ISPs. Data Retention as a Tool for Investigat-
ing Internet Child Pornography and Other Internet Crimes, Hearings before the
H. S. Comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 6–8 (2011)
(statement of Jason Weinstein, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).  Recent proposals also urge online sites or services that
allows users to communicate (such as blogs, social networks, and e-mail services)
to track and retain data about every communication that any user makes online.
Id. at 34–35 (statement of John B. Morris, Jr., General Counsel, Center for De-
mocracy and Technology).
39. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967) (“[T]he fantastic advances in
the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of
the individual; . . . indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises
grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . .”
(quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963))).
40. Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶¶ 62–70.
41. Id. ¶¶ 62–63.
42. United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066–67 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding an ISP’s
execution of a search warrant constitutional because the Fourth Amendment
“does not explicitly require official presence during a warrant’s execution, there-
fore it is not an automatic violation if no officer is present during a search” (citing
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931–34 (1995))).
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cessed stored e-mail communications.43  Stored e-mail surveillance is
indiscriminate in that current law permits the government to seize
stored e-mails without limitations as to the time frame, the parties to
the communication, or the subject matter of the communication,
which almost certainly results in the disclosure of information per-
taining to innocent individuals and activities.44  It is continuous with-
out constraints because the government can acquire stored e-mails
spanning indefinite periods of time.45  The risk of exposing intimate
and innocent correspondence when searching and seizing stored e-
mails is thus magnified given the hundreds or even thousands of
emails associated with a single e-mail account.46
Perhaps most importantly, stored email surveillance can be ex-
traordinarily intrusive.  The Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland47
held the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the government’s use
of pen registers, which record the numbers dialed on a telephone.  In
so holding, the Court noted the “limited capabilities” of the pen regis-
ter and the limited nature of the information elicited from a pen regis-
ter.48  Unlike wiretaps, which record the contents of conversations,
the government does not obtain the purport of communications be-
tween a caller and the recipient, or their respective identities from
pen-register surveillance.49  It was these characteristics that rendered
pen-register surveillance less intrusive than wiretapping for purposes
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis.50  By way of analogy,
courts have generally declined to extend Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to internet subscriber information.51
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
44. Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 68; see United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433,
1442–43 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir.
1984).
45. Torres, 751 F.2d at 884 (finding that electronic surveillance is “by nature a con-
tinuing rather than one-shot invasion” and “is even less discriminating than a
physical search, because it picks up private conversations (most of which will
usually have nothing to do with any illegal activity) over a long period of time”);
Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 70.
46. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284–85 (6th Cir. 2010).
47. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
48. See id. at 741.
49. Id. (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 842–47 (11th Cir. 2010) (summarizing
case law holding Fourth Amendment does not extend to non-content informa-
tion), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161,
164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding individuals do not have protectable expectation of
privacy in electronic subscriber information); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d
1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining Fourth Amendment protection does
not extend to subscriber information sent to Yahoo!); United States v. Forrester,
512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no privacy interest in non-content
information by way of analogy to telephone numbers).
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In contrast, searches and seizures of the content of stored e-mail is
more intrusive than wiretapping or video surveillance because e-mails
typically contain more personal and sensitive information—which
touches on many private aspects of life—than do analogous phone con-
versations or silent videos.52  In Warshak v. United States,53 the Sixth
Circuit emphasized the large amount of information that e-mail ac-
counts often contain:
People are now able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantane-
ously, to friends, family, and colleagues half a world away.  Lovers exchange
sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a
mouse button.  Commerce has also taken hold in email.  Online purchases are
often documented in email accounts, and email is frequently used to remind
patients and clients of imminent appointments.  In short, “account” is an apt
word for the conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email ac-
count, as it provides an account of its owner’s life.54
The Supreme Court also recently acknowledged in City of Ontario
v. Quon55 that certain technologies may be “so pervasive that some
persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instru-
ments for self-expression,” which “strengthen[s] the case for an expec-
tation of privacy.”56  The case for Fourth Amendment protections for
stored e-mail is inherently strong as e-mail is “the technological scion
of tangible mail, and it plays an indispensable part in the
[i]nformation [a]ge.”57  Although the Court indicated particularly per-
vasive technologies, such as e-mail, may present a strong case for con-
stitutional protections, the Court side-stepped the issue of whether
and when the Fourth Amendment protects electronic communica-
tions.58
E-mail is as important to Fourth Amendment principles today as
protecting telephone conversations was in the past.59  Its pervasive-
ness as a central medium of communication has significantly height-
ened online privacy concerns—the government can peer deeply into
the corners of an individual’s private life to a greater degree than ever
before by obtaining access to the contents of the individual’s e-mail
52. See United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is a far
greater potential for . . . a consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a
search for evidence on a computer.”); Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 66.
53. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
54. Id. at 284.
55. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
56. Id. at 2630.
57. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286.
58. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629 (stating that in Katz, “the Court relied on its own knowl-
edge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a telephone booth” but noting that Katz acknowledged it was “not so clear that
courts . . . are on so sure a ground” as to electronic devices).
59. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (“To read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communication.”).
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account.60  A focused look into the invasive nature of stored e-mail
surveillance, and the excessive privacy intrusions that result if such
surveillance is not kept in check,61 compels the conclusion that sur-
veillance of stored e-mails and files must comport with the Fourth
Amendment.  The few appellate opinions to consider the issue seem to
agree.62  The Sixth Circuit now recognizes that the Fourth Amend-
ment extends to e-mails “that are stored with, or sent or received
through, a commercial ISP.”63  Courts will likely follow the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s lead and acknowledge that a constitutionally-protected privacy
right in the contents of e-mail communications exists, thereby recog-
nizing that e-mail surveillance excessively intrudes on privacy rights
and is susceptible to abuse without adequate oversight.64  As a result,
the textual components of the Fourth Amendment govern the consti-
tutionality of stored e-mail surveillance.
III. SCHOLARLY AND STATUTORY RESPONSES TO
STORED E-MAIL SURVEILLANCE
The constitutionality of government surveillance is judged against
the Fourth Amendment’s general rule of reasonableness—the Amend-
ment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.”65  Reasonable-
ness is determined by balancing the government’s need to search or
seize against the invasion which the search or seizure entails.66  A
search or seizure of stored e-mail will be considered constitutional if
“reasonable” and unconstitutional if “unreasonable,” but what defines
reasonableness?  The answer is a combination of Fourth Amendment
rules and presumptions that are designed to control the conduct of
government officials who may significantly intrude upon privacy
interests.67
60. See id.
61. See Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶¶ 21, 51; Ohm, supra note 8, at 1558.
62. E.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 842–47 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding the appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment to e-mail content is not clearly established and
therefore qualified immunity was appropriate); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded by City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–33 (2010).
63. United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010)).
64. See Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶¶ 71–72.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (citing
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)).
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
67. Id.
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A. Overemphasizing the Probable Cause Warrant
One such rule of reasonableness holds that a warrant is required
before the government can conduct searches and seizures.68  As the
Supreme Court noted in the context of telephone surveillance, the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does “not vanish when the
search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office,
or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth.”69  Thus, an electronic
device, used without trespass onto any given enclosure, is a search for
which a Fourth Amendment warrant is needed.70  As Orin Kerr notes,
the Court’s “forceful rejection of a warrant exception for telephone
bugging seems to extend naturally to the [i]nternet” as it is difficult to
articulate why searches and seizures of internet communications,
such as e-mail, might justify treatment different from audio-bugging a
telephone booth.71
To justify the issuance of a warrant for the contents of stored e-
mails, the government is required to establish probable cause to
search and seize those contents.  To do so, the government must estab-
lish a “fair probability” under the totality of the circumstances72 that
the e-mails sought contain contraband, evidence of a crime, fruits of a
crime, or the instrumentality of a crime.73  According to the Supreme
Court, the probable cause standard is satisfied by an affidavit that
establishes “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.”74
Probable cause will not exist if the government can only point to a
“bare suspicion” that criminal evidence will be found in the place
searched.75  Probable cause serves to guarantee a substantial
probability that the privacy invasions resulting from surveillance will
be justified by discovery of offending items.76  Yet as Paul Ohm notes,
it is increasingly common that “whenever the police have any suspi-
68. Absent a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions which gener-
ally do not apply to electronic surveillance. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357–58 (1967) (“It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could
ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case.”).
69. Id. at 359.
70. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 758 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
71. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1042–43.
72. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
73. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c); COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELEC-
TRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 63 (3d ed. 2009), [hereinafter
CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL].
74. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
75. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
76. E.g., United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319, 321 (8th Cir. 1981); Comment,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment,
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 690 (1961).
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cion at all about a piece of evidence, they almost always have probable
cause.”77  Supporting this argument is the technological architecture
of the internet and the substance of court opinions addressing the
issue.78
During an investigation the government pursues any and all digi-
tal, evidentiary leads, which turn out to be either “gold mines or dead
ends, rarely something in between.”79  Suspicion therefore oscillates
between probable cause and nothing at all.80  Here is a common scena-
rio: Investigators learn that an individual has been using an internet
protocol (IP) address to commit a crime.  Perhaps they obtain copies of
incriminating e-mails—the messages are rich in leads toward identi-
fying the sender, “most importantly in the message headers like the
‘To’ and the ‘Received’ lines that show the path taken across the
[i]nternet.”81  Whether they have the individual’s IP address or e-mail
address (or other identifying handle), the investigators can subpoena
the ISP associated with that IP address or e-mail account and obtain
the individual’s name and home address.82  A government affidavit
that describes such an investigation is typically sufficient to establish
probable cause to obtain a traditional search warrant.83
While probable cause will look different in every case, empirical
evidence compels the conclusion that the government either has prob-
able cause or no suspicion at almost every stage of almost every in-
ternet investigation.84  Court opinions have never held the
government lacked probable cause to investigate an e-mail address or
an IP address.85  This even includes the few cases calling online sur-
veillance into question.86  Consequently, it follows that in the context
77. Ohm, supra note 8, at 1515.
78. Id. at 1525.
79. Id. at 1527.
80. Id. at 1529.
81. Id. at 1526–27.
82. CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 65; Kerr, supra note 8, at
1026 (citing United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000));
Ohm, supra note 8, at 1527.
83. See CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 65; Ohm, supra note
8, at 1527–28.
84. Ohm, supra note 8, at 1525.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1525, 1535 (citing Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174,
181–84 (D. Conn. 2005)).  Additionally, although the Ninth Circuit held a show-
ing of probable cause, instead of mere relevance, was necessary for government
access to certain communications under the SCA, the United States Department
of Justice has never petitioned the legislature to reverse this decision. Id. at
1536.  Paul Ohm argues the United States Department of Justice’s inaction indi-
cates that the Ninth Circuit’s enhanced standard matters little to law enforce-
ment because “whenever the police have any suspicion in an online case, they
have probable cause.” Id. at 1541.
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of stored e-mail surveillance, the importance of the probable cause jus-
tification standard is waning.
B. Warrantless Surveillance and the Unconstitutionality of
the SCA
In an attempt to create a statutory version of the Fourth Amend-
ment for computer networks, Congress enacted the SCA87 in 1986 as
part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.88  The SCA gov-
erns the surveillance of stored e-mail content, delineating the proce-
dural steps the government must take in order to access e-mail
accounts and the communications contained therein.  Enacted before
e-mail became a central medium of communication, the SCA permits
the government to compel disclosure of certain stored e-mails without
a probable cause warrant.89  This statutory framework is thus in dis-
harmony with the Fourth Amendment’s safeguards, safeguards which
ensure the reasonableness of searches and seizures.
Many scholars questioning the constitutionality of the SCA have
focused on this particular issue, recommending a warrant based on
probable cause for all surveillance of stored e-mail communications.90
Yet, since the Supreme Court addressed how and why wiretapping
triggers Fourth Amendment protections in Berger v. New York91 and
Katz v. United States,92 federal courts have generally avoided consti-
tutional scrutiny of modern electronic-surveillance laws.93  The Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Warshak,94 however, indicates that courts are
now willing to question the constitutionality of the SCA.
87. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 335 (6th Cir. 2010) (Keith, J., con-
curring) (“The purpose of . . . the Stored Communications Act . . . is to maintain
the boundaries between a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy and crime
prevention in light of quickly advancing technology.”); United States v. Ahrndt,
No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *8 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010).
88. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b), (d) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (authorizing compelled disclosure
of contents originally maintained solely for purposes of “storage or computer
processing” with a subpoena or court order).
90. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1436 (2004); Kerr, supra note 8, at 1043; Deirdre K. Mulli-
gan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspec-
tive on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557,
1592 (2004); Solove, supra note 8, at 1299.
91. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
92. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
93. Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 2. But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the govern-
ment to obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”).
94. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Congress may provide additional statutory protections above the
Fourth Amendment’s safeguards when it chooses to do so,95 but Con-
gress cannot deny citizens the full panoply of protections the Fourth
Amendment provides.  Recognizing the constitutional pitfalls of the
SCA and the attendant ramifications of the statute’s inadequacies,
some members of Congress have recently expressed the need to amend
the SCA in order align searches and seizures of stored communica-
tions with the commands of the Fourth Amendment.96  Twenty-five
years after authoring the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill on May 17, 2011 that uni-
formly requires the government to obtain a search warrant in order to
access the contents of stored e-mail.97
Even if the scholars prevail, even if the SCA is amended to require
the government to obtain a warrant based on probable cause to search
and seize stored e-mail, and even if the courts follow the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s lead, stored e-mails and files will be subject to unreasonable
searches and seizures due to a lack of adequate Fourth Amendment
protections.  Obtaining a probable cause warrant is merely one compo-
nent of the reasonableness inquiry.  When a warrant lacks sufficient
particularity, the subsequent search or seizure is considered warrant-
less and therefore presumptively unreasonable and unconstitu-
tional.98  It is the particularity requirement that provides additional
protection and ensures the purpose of the probable cause requirement
is not wholly aborted.99  Probable cause and particularity work hand-
in-hand: to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, the
government must demonstrate the described items are connected with
the criminal activity under investigation and the items are to be found
in the place to be searched.100  The less precise the description of the
things to be seized, the more likely it will be that one or both of those
probabilities has not been established. 101
To safeguard individual privacy, probable cause works in conjunc-
tion with particularity to keep the government out of constitutionally
protected areas until it has reason to believe a specific crime has been
95. For example, Congress included procedural safeguards in the Wiretap Act de-
rived from the particularity requirement above and beyond what the Fourth
Amendment requires. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)–(f) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
96. See infra note 97.
97. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong., § 3 (2011).
98. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559–63 (2004).
99. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
100. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(a) (4th ed. 2009); see also Kerr,
supra note 8, at 1045 (“The particularity requirement determines how far the
government can search based on a particular factual predicate . . . the less the
government can search, the harder it is for the government to abuse its powers to
conduct wide-ranging searches . . . .”).
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or is being committed,102 thereby prohibiting the “general, exploratory
rummaging in a person’s belongings.”103  By limiting the govern-
ment’s authorization to search only specific areas and seize only spe-
cific things for which probable cause exists, the particularity
requirement ensures searches and seizures—electronic or otherwise—
are tailored to their justifications.104  Yet while much attention has
been given to probable cause in the context of stored e-mail surveil-
lance,105 how the particularity requirement applies in that context is
not well known or explored.  A previously unanswered question there-
fore remains: how particular must warrants for stored e-mail commu-
nications be to satisfy the Fourth Amendment?  The standards set
forth below provide ample guidance to the courts and law enforcement
to ensure warrants for stored e-mail communications are sufficiently
particular to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
IV. STORED E-MAIL PARTICULARITY IN PRACTICE
The manifest purpose of the particularity requirement is to pre-
vent general warrants that authorize exploratory rummaging in a per-
son’s belongings—the government can only search specific places and
seize specific things.106  Thus, a search pursuant to a particularized
warrant will not invade the privacy of the individual whose premises
are to be searched and whose property is to be seized beyond what is
necessary to achieve a valid law enforcement purpose.107  In addition,
requiring particularized warrants “assures the individual whose prop-
erty is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing of-
ficer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”108
With the rise of the internet, the government has an increasing
need to examine e-mails and files stored by ISPs.  At the same time,
the digital age heightens the privacy concerns implicated by broad
searches and seizures of stored e-mail—as compared to the days of
paper records.109  A target e-mail account, in addition to containing e-
mails relevant to an investigation, will undoubtedly contain e-mails
102. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.
103. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1967) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971)).
104. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
105. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SUR-
VEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21–47 (2007) (arguing for a “reconceptu-
alization” of the Fourth Amendment’s justification standards).
106. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84; Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479.
107. United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999).
108. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 9 (1977)).
109. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT II), 621 F.3d 1162, 1177
(9th Cir. 2010).
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and files the government has no probable cause to search and seize.110
Greater vigilance on the part of judicial officers is thus required in
striking the right balance between the government’s interest in law
enforcement and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.111  Responsible judicial officers must take care
to ensure stored e-mail searches and seizures occur in a manner that
minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.112  The purposes
served by the Fourth Amendment provide guidance as to how the par-
ticularity requirement should be enforced—adequately protecting pri-
vacy interests in stored e-mail communications without unduly
burdening government investigations.113
A. The Place to be Searched
The particularity requirement first mandates that warrants de-
scribe with particularity the place to be searched.114  A description of
the place to be searched is constitutionally reasonable if it is suffi-
ciently particular to enable the executing law-enforcement agent to
locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and if there is
no reasonable probability that another premise might be mistakenly
searched.115
In the digital realm, whether a description of a place to be searched
is sufficiently particular is a complicated question because of the dif-
ferences between the physical and digital worlds.  As Orin Kerr notes,
physicality limits scale in the physical world, and the particularity re-
quirement is based on that scale.116  The internet is different—a per-
son likely has only one home in the physical world but can have
multiple e-mail accounts maintained by multiple providers.117  If e-
110. See id. at 1176 (“Seizure of . . . Google’s email servers to look for a few incriminat-
ing messages could jeopardize the privacy of millions.”); United States v. Cioffi,
668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
111. See CDT II, 621 F.3d at 1177.
112. See Andresen v. Maryland, 417 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1967).
113. See LAFAVE, supra note 101, § 4.6(a) (“[O]ften a judgment as to the sufficiency of
a description of items to be seized under a search warrant cannot be made by
reference to earlier decisions . . . . Rather, such a judgment necessitates an evalu-
ation of the description in question in terms of the purposes underlying the
Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity.”).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
115. United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States
v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. McCain, 677
F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1300
(9th Cir. 1985) (“The particularity requirement inquires into the sufficiency of the
description of the premises to be searched, and tests whether ‘the officer with a
search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place in-
tended.’” (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925))).
116. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1045.
117. Id. at 1045–46.
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mails containing evidence of a crime are stored in one of several e-mail
accounts belonging to a suspect, law enforcement might be unable to
determine which account contains the sought-after e-mails, and law
enforcement may thus be unable to search any one of the e-mail
accounts.118
Kerr suggests that for online searches, the particularity require-
ment should be satisfied by identifying the individual under investiga-
tion rather than identifying a specific e-mail account.119  Kerr comes
to this conclusion by way of analogy to the statutory “roving wiretap”
authority, which permits the government to wiretap any telephone
line used by a person under investigation—rather than limit a wire-
tap to a specific telephone line.120  Although the Federal Wiretap Act
requires there be “a particular description of the nature and location
of the facilities from which [information is sought] or the place where
the communication is to be intercepted,”121 such description is unnec-
essary as to the interception of wire or electronic communication if the
suspect may try to thwart interception by changing facilities.122
These roving wiretaps are therefore permitted if the government iden-
tifies “the person committing the offense and whose communications
are to be intercepted.”123  Kerr argues these same principles should
permit the government to search all e-mail accounts of an individual
under investigation rather than require the government to specifically
identify an e-mail account.124
Kerr’s approach, however, is problematic for at least two reasons.
To begin, it is true courts upheld the constitutionality of the roving
wiretap statute despite challenges alleging insufficient adherence to
the particularity requirement.125  The statute has been held to pro-
vide sufficient particularization because only telephone facilities actu-
ally used by an identified speaker may be subject to surveillance,126
and the Wiretap Act contains particularity safeguards that go beyond
118. Id. at 1046 (arguing that without knowledge of which e-mail account contains the
sought-after e-mails, law enforcement may “lack probable cause to search any
one account” and “[as] a result, every account will remain unsearched even if the
police have probable cause to believe that the evidence” is in one of the accounts).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1046–47 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b).
122. Id. § 2518(11).
123. Id.
124. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1047; see United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 91 (6th
Cir. 1985) (stating that particularization did not require judge issuing warrant
for wiretap to approve the precise location in the house where each listening de-
vice would be placed).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545 (5th Cir.1996); United States v.
Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445
(9th Cir. 1992).
126. Petti, 973 F.2d at 1445.
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what the Fourth Amendment requires.127  The Wiretap Act’s many
safeguards concerning roving and fixed interceptions have thus been
held to satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that “no greater
invasion of privacy [occur] than [is] necessary to meet the legitimate
needs of law enforcement.”128  However, the SCA does not contain the
safeguards of the Wiretap Act, safeguards that eliminate the possibil-
ity of abuse or mistake and prevent wide-ranging exploratory
searches.129  Unless and until the SCA is amended to incorporate sim-
ilar safeguards, Kerr’s proposition falls short of satisfying the particu-
larity requirement.  Yet it is unlikely the SCA will be amended in this
manner, as information acquired in real time has traditionally been
afforded more protection than electronically stored information.130
In addition, permitting the government to scour every one of an
individual’s e-mail accounts would be akin to revenue officers in colo-
nial days who scoured “suspected places” pursuant to a general war-
rant.131  According to the United States Department of Justice, when
probable cause to search relates to stored information, rather than to
the storage device itself, the warrant should focus on the content of
the relevant files rather than on the storage devices which might con-
tain the files.132  The particularity requirement was designed to en-
sure the government searches only specific places and that probable
cause to search such places actually exists.133  Granted, the Supreme
Court has taken a flexible interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
order to keep pace with the technologically advancing society,134 hold-
ing in United States v. Karo135 that advance identification of the place
127. For example, the government is required to provide a statement as to “whether or
not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reason-
ably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous” and must use
standard minimization procedures to ensure that only conversations relating to a
crime in which the speaker is a suspected participant are intercepted. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(c), (5).
128. Petti, 973 F.2d at 1445 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 357, 355–56
(1967)); see also United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding
a warrant drafted in accordance with the requirements of the Wiretap Act will
not “grant a roving commission or general warrant to seize any and all
conversations”).
129. Cox, 449 F. 2d at 687.
130. See JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
§ 1:14 (Thomson West ed., 2007); Freiwald, supra note 32, at 42–73 (comparing
the procedures for online surveillance to those for wiretapping).
131. See In re United States of America’s Application for a Search Warrant to Seize
and Search Electronic Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D.
Wash. 2011).
132. CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 72.
133. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 501–02 (1925).
134. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 n.10 (1981).
135. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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to be searched was unnecessary in another context.136  Yet in Karo,
the government argued it was impossible to specify in advance the
place to be searched because the location of the place was “precisely
what [was] sought to be discovered through the search.”137
In contrast, a description specifically identifying the e-mail account
should be included in a warrant if the government uncovers an e-mail
address—or other information that can be traced to a particular e-
mail account—containing the targeted communications.138  If the gov-
ernment does not know and cannot obtain this information, Kerr’s ap-
proach regarding particularity of the place to be searched seems
promising.  However, as to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that
warrants must also particularly describe the things to be seized, Kerr’s
solution falls short.
B. The Things to be Seized
The second part of the particularity requirement commands that
warrants particularly describe the things to be seized, thereby
preventing the seizure of one thing under a warrant that describes
another.139  According to the Supreme Court, “[a]s to what is to be
taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the war-
rant.”140  Because surveillance of stored e-mail communications in-
volves privacy intrusions that are broad in scope, courts authorizing
such surveillance have a responsibility to issue warrants that afford
“similar protections to those [protections] that are present in the use
of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible
evidence.”141
Drawing from established principles of particularity in both the
physical and digital realm, this Section sets forth the rules that gov-
ern the constitutional sufficiency of a warrant which describes stored
e-mails and files to be seized.  Central to these rules is the basic tenet
that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to describe the
stored e-mails and files to be seized with as much detail as its knowl-
edge and the circumstances allow.142  The proposed parameters of
particularity emphasize a warrant authorizing the government to
seize stored e-mails should focus on e-mail content.  To begin, such a
warrant should identify the individual under investigation and the
136. Id. at 718.
137. Id.
138. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427 n.15 (1977) (“The Fourth
Amendment requires specification of ‘the place to be searched . . . .’ In the wiretap
context, [that requirement is] satisfied by identification of the telephone line to be
tapped . . . .”).
139. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
140. Id.
141. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967).
142. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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other parties to the e-mail communication, if known.  Furthermore,
the government should seize only those stored e-mails and files sent or
received during the time period the evidence suggests the criminal ac-
tivity occurred.  Lastly, warrants should identify the specific crime to
which the stored e-mails or files relate.  These safeguards ensure the
authorization to seize stored e-mail communications is carefully cir-
cumscribed so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy.143
1. Principles of Describing the Things to be Seized
Particularly describing the things to be seized has two distinct ele-
ments.144  First, the description of the things to be seized must be lim-
ited to the scope of the probable cause established in the warrant.145
A warrant’s description of the stored e-mails and files should be ren-
dered defective if it is broader than the probable cause upon which the
warrant is based.146  Courts will consider whether probable cause ex-
ists to seize all items of a particular category described in the warrant
to determine whether a description of the items is overbroad.147  This
“consideration encapsulates the overarching Fourth Amendment prin-
ciple that police must have probable cause to search and seize all the
items of a particular type described in the warrant.”148  Probable
cause to believe that some incriminating e-mails will be present in an
143. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 57 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
144. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999).
145. See In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Solid State Devices, Inc., 130 F.3d
853, 857 (9th Cir. 1997).
146. LAFAVE, supra note 101, § 4.6(a) (“[A]n otherwise unobjectionable description of
the objects to be seized is defective if it is broader than can be justified by the
probable cause upon which the warrant is based.”); see also Millender v. Cnty. of
L.A., 620 F.3d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating probable cause to search for
documents pertaining to “certain aspects of an operation” cannot justify the
seizure of all documents in an office); United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104,
1110 (7th Cir. 1987) (“When the probable cause covers fewer documents in a sys-
tem of files, the warrant must . . . tell the officers how to separate the documents
to be seized from others.”); Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1987)
(“Although probable cause existed to search the records of one particular project,
the warrant failed to so limit the search.”); United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d
959, 967 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing a list of criminal statutes in warrant that
went beyond probable cause in affidavit); Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 408
(10th Cir. 1985) (Logan, J., concurring) (“The breadth of a warrant must be justi-
fied by the breadth of the probable cause.”); cf. VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d
364, 369 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[A]lthough there may have been ‘probable cause’ to
search for and seize [records of a certain type and date] there was no probable
cause shown for a seizure of all the . . . books and records, or . . . personal and
private papers.”).
147. Millender, 620 F.3d at 1025.
148. Id. at 1030; see also United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684,
702–03 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, 926
F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1991); VonderAhe, 508 F.2d at 369–70.
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e-mail account does not necessarily mean there is probable cause to
believe there will be more of the same.149  Courts will not mechani-
cally reason “some implies more;” rather, pre-warrant investigations,
as described in affidavits presented to a magistrate judge, must estab-
lish probable cause that more e-mails are contained in the account
that provide evidence of the crime under investigation.150  “The pre-
mise here is that any intrusion in the way of search or seizure is an
evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior de-
termination of necessity.”151  This prevents fishing expeditions—lim-
iting searches to the suspected criminal activity.152
For example, imagine a woman named Sheila reports to law en-
forcement agents that her ex-husband Brian has been sending her
harassing e-mails.  Sheila cannot produce the e-mails, however, be-
cause Brian hacked her e-mail account, deleted all of her e-mails, and
changed her password, consequently preventing her from accessing
her account.  If the government establishes probable cause to seize the
harassing e-mails from Brian’s e-mail account, but has no reason to
believe the other e-mails in his account contain incriminating infor-
mation, there is no probable cause to justify seizing Brian’s non-
harassing e-mails.153
Second, a warrant must describe the things to be seized with suffi-
ciently precise language so that it informs the officers how to separate
the items that are properly subject to seizure from those that are irrel-
evant.154  A warrant’s description of the e-mails to be seized must pro-
vide objective guidance to government agents conducting the
149. See United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1990) (Stewart, J.,
plurality).
150. Id. (citing United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1339–40 (9th Cir. 1982)).
151. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
152. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2004).
153. See SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d at 704 (holding a portion of a search war-
rant authorizing the search for “[d]ocuments relating to non-privileged internal
memoranda and E-mail” was invalid when the government’s interest was limited
to communications related to sleep studies); Weber, 923 F.2d at 1343 (citing
VonderAhe, 508 F.2d at 370).
154. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 296 (1927) (“As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”); Davis v.
Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Kunze, 806 F.2d 594,
598 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The items to be seized must be described with sufficient
particularity such that the executing officer is left with no discretion to decide
what may be seized.”).
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search155 so they may distinguish between those e-mails they can
seize and those they cannot.156
When the government has probable cause during an online investi-
gation, it generally has an arsenal of information at its fingertips.157
Evidence of a crime collected during an investigation often reveals
critical information such as the date of the crime’s commission, the
specific times the crime occurred, the identities of the perpetrators,
and the subject matter to which the crime pertains.158  If there is in-
deed probable cause to believe e-mails stored in an account are contra-
band, or contain contraband such as fruits or instrumentalities of the
crime, the government can likely seize such information and use it to
narrow the universe of e-mail communications it seeks to obtain.
Courts have routinely deemed warrants insufficiently particular if
information known or available to the government is not used to nar-
row the description of the items to be seized. 159  Thus, warrants have
155. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979); Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 (2nd Cir. 2010)
(holding a warrant failed the particularity requirement because it “directed of-
ficers to seize and search certain electronic devices, but provided them with no
guidance as to the type of evidence sought”); United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d
511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480–82
(1976)); United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986)); United States v.
Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2nd Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Constitution requires particu-
larization in the warrant, i.e., the warrant must describe . . . the information
sought.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (imposing the
same requirements to obtain a wiretap order); United States v. Cioffi, 668 F.
Supp. 2d 385, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding warrant violated the particularity
requirement where it authorized the search of all e-mails in a defendant’s e-mail
account but did not limit the search to e-mails related to the alleged crime and
did not incorporate by reference the affidavit containing the description of the
alleged crime and the associated use of the target e-mail account).
156. See Marron, 275 U.S. at 196 (“As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”); Gracey, 111 F.3d at 1478;
United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. See supra section II.A.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Burdulis, No. 10-40003-FDS, 2011 WL 1898941, at *6
(D. Mass. May 19, 2011) (providing that police conducting online investigation
obtained file names, dates, times, and content of e-mails and pictures).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he fourth
amendment [sic] requires that the government describe the items to be seized
with as much specificity as the government’s knowledge and circumstances allow,
and warrants are conclusively invalidated by their substantial failure to specify
as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be
seized.”); United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987) (“In light of
the information available to the agents which could have served to narrow the
scope of the warrant and protect the defendants’ personal rights, the warrant was
inadequate.” (quoting United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 1977))
(internal quotations omitted)), United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.
Unit A Sept. 1981) (“Failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a
general description in a warrant.”); VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 370
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been invalidated when the government had information that would
have particularized the description of items to be seized but failed to
include such information in the warrant.160  Requiring the govern-
ment to use the information it has acquired during an investigation to
specifically describe targeted, stored e-mails limits the possibility that
the government will seize communications beyond what is justified by
the established probable cause.161  Additionally, failure to describe
the items to be seized with as much particularity as the circumstances
reasonably allow offends the Fourth Amendment because there is no
assurance the permitted invasions of privacy and property are no
more than absolutely necessary.162
Considered together, the two elements of particularly describing
the things to be seized prevent government agents from executing the
free-ranging “general warrant” the framers intended to prohibit.163
The elements instead require agents to conduct narrow seizures that
minimize unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.164  Both Congress
and courts have recognized the need for particularity is especially
great when electronic surveillance involves broadly scoped intrusions
on privacy.165  Concerned with the threats that electronic surveillance
poses to individual privacy and liberty, courts have required such sur-
veillance to be “carefully circumscribed” so as to prevent unauthorized
invasions of privacy.166
The privacy invasions that result from stored e-mail surveillance
are broad indeed.  The government frequently exercises its power to
access the contents of stored e-mails without limiting the scope of the
communications sought, as demonstrated by the introductory hypo-
thetical,167 based on the facts of United States v. Warshak.168  In War-
shak, the government acquired approximately 27,000 of Steven
Warshak’s stored e-mails which contained his entire business and per-
(9th Cir. 1974) (“Upon the information available to it, the government knew ex-
actly what it needed and wanted . . . . There was no necessity for a massive re-
examination of all records.”).
160. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
161. See LAFAVE, supra note 101, § 4.6(a).
162. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); United States v. Card-
well, 680 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 186
(1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2nd Cir. 1970).
163. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
164. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1967).
165. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967) (“The ‘indiscriminate use of such de-
vices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments,’ and imposes ‘a heavier responsibility on this Court in its
supervision of the fairness of procedures . . . .’ ” (quoting Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966))).
166. Id. at 55, 58.
167. See supra Part I.
168. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
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sonal life,169 but the government did not narrow its acquisition based
on need.170  E-mail accounts are much like computer hard drives be-
cause “[i]ndividuals may store personal letters, e-mails, financial in-
formation, passwords, family photos, and countless other items of a
personal nature in electronic form” accounts which are “capable of
holding a universe of private information.”171  In United States v.
Otero,172 the Tenth Circuit noted the ability of computers “to store
and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place
increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search
into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the particularity
requirement that much more important.”173
2. Particularity Parameters
In the face of advancing surveillance techniques, it is not novel to
establish rules that pertain to descriptions of places to be searched
and things to be seized in order to satisfy the particularity require-
ment.  In Berger, the Supreme Court held the “failure to describe with
particularity the conversations sought gives the officer a roving com-
mission to ‘seize’ any and all conversations” in violation Fourth
Amendment.174  The Court held the lack of particularity gave the gov-
ernment too much discretion when executing wiretap searches and
seizures.175  To prevent such violations, the Wiretap Act requires the
government to describe the types of conversations sought before it can
utilize a wiretap.176  This procedural protection has been extended to
the government’s use of silent video surveillance because such surveil-
lance exhibits the same constitutional infirmities as wiretapping.177
Seven federal appellate courts have held the government must first
169. Id. at 281–82.
170. Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 68 (stating the defendant in Warshak claimed the gov-
ernment obtained thousands of emails “without any particularization or limita-
tion as to time frame, parties to the communication, or the subject matter of the
communication”).
171. See United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2009).
172. 563 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2009).
173. Id. at 1132; see In re United States of America’s Application for a Search Warrant
to Seize and Search Electronic Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (“There are just too many secrets on people’s com-
puters, most legal, some embarrassing, and some potentially tragic in their impli-
cations, for loose liberality in allowing search warrants.”).
174. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
175. Id.; see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979); United States v.
Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Andresen v. New York, 427
U.S. 463, 480–82 (1976); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
177. See Freiwald, supra note 32, at 79–80.
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describe with particularity the activity sought to be videotaped before
a warrant authorizing such surveillance is granted.178
The same principle driving this procedural protection in context of
wiretaps and silent videos applies to stored e-mail surveillance, and
the intrusiveness of stored e-mail surveillance commands the same re-
striction.179  In Berger, the Court analogized eavesdropping over a
two-month period to a “series of intrusions, searches, and seizures
[based on one] showing of probable cause.”180  Likewise, when the gov-
ernment seizes the entirety of an individual’s e-mail account, it ob-
tains a continuous record of a person’s private affairs with a single
authorization.181  As such, the scope of an e-mail seizure must be con-
strained by content.182  While the government may not be required to
seek court approval of each and every precise e-mail to be seized,183
warrants should describe the content of targeted e-mails and files
with as much detail as possible, rather than focus on the e-mail ac-
count which may happen to contain them.184  Such specific descrip-
tions are necessary to avoid the type of indiscriminate rummaging the
Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit.185  Therefore, warrants
for stored e-mails should fail for want of particularity if the e-mails to
be seized could be narrowed by certain parameters—discussed be-
low—when such information is known or ascertainable by the
government.
178. See Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 54 (citing United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d
536, 542 (9th Cir. 2002)).
179. Id. ¶¶ 62–70; see also supra Part II (discussing the analogy between wiretaps and
e-mail surveillance).
180. Berger, 388 U.S. at 59.
181. Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 70.
182. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v.
Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]arrants for computer searches
must affirmatively limit the search to evidence of specific federal crimes or spe-
cific types of material.” (quoting United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862
(10th Cir. 2005))).
183. See United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 n.8 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (“[A]
strict interpretation of the particularity requirement as to things seized would
require court approval of each and every conversation that would be monitored
prior to the actual monitoring.  This is clearly not required under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
184. See United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *36
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (“[U]nderlying information must be identified with partic-
ularity and its seizure independently supported by probable cause.”); CCIPS
SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 70, 72 (citing United States v.
Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999)).
185. See Berger, 388 U.S. at 59; see also United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 835 (5th
Cir. 2010) (“A general order to explore and rummage through a person’s belong-
ings is not permitted.”); Riccardi, 405 F.3d at 862–63 (providing that a search
must not be a wide-ranging exploration (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79, 84 (1987))).
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i. Specifying Identity
Warrants for stored e-mails should identify the person under in-
vestigation and the other suspected, involved individuals or entities
whose communications are sought, if such identities are known to the
government at the time the warrant is issued.186  For instance, when
the government applies for a wiretap order, the Wiretap Act requires
the application for authorization state “the identity of the person, if
known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be
intercepted”187 and that the wiretap order “shall . . . specify the iden-
tity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be inter-
cepted.” 188
Interpreting the former statutory requirement, the Supreme Court
noted in United States v. Donovan189 that Congress included the iden-
tification requirement in response to Berger and Katz—the require-
ment was intended to “reflect . . . the constitutional command of
particularization.”190  The Court held “a wiretap application must
name an individual if the [g]overnment has probable cause to believe
that the individual is engaged in the criminal activity under investiga-
tion and expects to intercept the individual’s conversations over the
target telephone.”191
186. See United States v. Hanna, Nos. 09–1425, 09–2086, 2011 WL 3524292, at *11
(6th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding warrants for stored e-mails limited to searches
of the person and company under investigation were sufficiently particular);
United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding warrant insuffi-
ciently particular in part because “the government did not contain the scope of
the warrant by reference to limiting descriptions in the affidavit such as HK
Video’s tax identification number, HK Video’s account number at the Bank of
Trade, or the names of the foreign companies allegedly receiving the proceeds of
the defendants’ profit-skimming”); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10,
1987, 926 F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding warrants contained a list of a
variety of documents as objects of the search but the list was qualified by the
requirement that the document seized be “in the name of or have reference to”
the target of the investigation or one of the twenty-one persons or entities linked
to the target through the investigation); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d
1433, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990); Nat’l City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d
1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding warrant was limited to “property of National
City Trading Corp. and persons associated with it”); see also Kerr, supra note 8,
at 1045–47 (arguing the particularity requirement should restrict an online in-
vestigation to a specifically named person); cf. United States v. Vogel, No. 4:08-
CR-224(1), 2010 WL 2268237, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 25, 2010) (holding warrant
did not limit evidence seized to communications between defendant, co-conspira-
tors, and other persons relevant to the investigation because government was not
fully aware of all the parties involved in a large conspiracy).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
188. Id. § 2518(4)(a).
189. 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
190. Id. at 426–27.
191. Id. at 428.
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It is worth noting that it may not be constitutionally fatal if a war-
rant does not specifically name the identities of all parties connected
to the targeted e-mail communications.192  In the wiretap context, for
example, the government is not required to specify each individual
whose conversations may be intercepted in the wiretap.  Where the
government investigates numerous members of an extensive or com-
plex criminal scheme, the government may not be able to identify each
person who will use—for criminal purposes—the particular telephone
under surveillance.193  As such, the government need only identify all
persons for whom such probable cause exists.194  Thus, if the govern-
ment has probable cause to believe specific individuals are engaged in
the criminal activity under investigation and expects to seize stored e-
mails from their e-mail accounts, the warrant should include their
identities.195
The Supreme Court speculated that Congress codified the Wiretap
Act’s identification requirement after concluding the particularity re-
quirement demands the naming of all suspects in a wiretap applica-
tion.196  If the particularity requirement commands the identification
of all persons for whom such probable cause exists in the wiretap con-
text, so too should a warrant for the contents of stored e-mails name
all such persons.  Yet the Supreme Court seems to disagree with Con-
gress’s interpretation of the particularity requirement.  According to
the Supreme Court:
The Fourth Amendment requires specification of “the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”  In the wiretap context, those require-
ments are satisfied by identification of the telephone line to be tapped and the
particular conversations to be seized.  It is not a constitutional requirement
that all those likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations
be named.  Specification of this sort “identif[ies] the person whose constitu-
tionally protected area is to be invaded rather than ‘particularly describing’
the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized.”197
Extending the Court’s interpretation to stored e-mail surveillance, a
warrant should identify the e-mail account—akin to a telephone
line—as the place to be searched and the written, e-mail conversa-
tions—akin to telephone conversations—as the things to be seized.198
192. Id.
193. United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112, 124 (2nd Cir. 2008).
194. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 428.
195. See id.; United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 604 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The warrant
could have been limited to documents related to . . . the companies suspected of
participating in the illegal export.”); see also United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588,
590 (2nd Cir. 1987) (holding warrant sufficiently particular if law enforcement
acquires all the descriptive facts which a reasonable investigation could be ex-
pected to cover and insures that all those facts are included in the warrant).
196. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 427.
197. Id. at 427 n.15 (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967)).
198. See id.
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Requiring warrants to identify the e-mail account to be searched
would, in many cases, have the same practical effect as if the individ-
ual were referenced by name.  Often, albeit not always, an e-mail ac-
count is tied to a single individual.  As previously discussed, when the
government learns the e-mail address of an individual under investi-
gation, it can subpoena the ISP associated with that address and ob-
tain the individual’s name and home address.199  It would not,
therefore, be unduly burdensome to require the government to iden-
tify the individual under investigation.  Nor would the failure to do so
render a stored e-mail warrant invalid.  However, combined with the
parameters discussed below, requiring warrants to identify—at a
minimum—the target e-mail account would prevent government
agents from exercising unfettered discretion and from seizing stored e-
mails for which there is insufficient justification.200
ii. Establishing a Time Frame
Depending on the server, the ISPs terms of use, and the account
holder’s preferences or actions, e-mails and files are stored by ISPs for
varying lengths of time.201  With a warrant for e-mails and files stored
in an account, the government can acquire a continuous record of the
targeted communications in a single shot.202  This creates a danger
the government, while examining certain stored emails or files, will
also examine a great many other stored communications in order to
exclude the possibility that the sought-after information is concealed
therein.203
When investigating agents know the evidence in support of proba-
ble cause revolves around a specific time frame, “the authorization to
search for evidence irrelevant to that time frame could well be de-
scribed as ‘rummaging.’”204  Although the government may be unable
to exactly describe the stored contents sought, its failure to limit broad
descriptions of e-mails and files by the relevant time period will
render a warrant overbroad when the government knows or can ascer-
tain relevant dates.205  Accordingly, if the government knows when
199. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
200. Cf. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154 (1974) (holding a wiretap order
containing a particular description of the type of communications sought to be
intercepted, a statement of the particular offense to which the communications
relate, and requiring surveillance minimization was not  a “virtual warrant” and
did not give federal agents unfettered discretion).
201. See DEUTCHMAN & MORGAN, supra note 37, at 10.
202. Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 70.
203. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT II), 621 F.3d 1162, 1176
(9th Cir. 2010).
204. E.g., United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 576 (6th Cir. 2006).
205. Cf. United States v. Hanna, Nos. 09-1425, 09-2086, 2011 WL 3524292, at *11 (6th
Cir. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding warrants for stored e-mails were not overbroad
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the criminal activity under investigation occurred, a warrant should
authorize the seizure of only those stored e-mails sent and received
during the time frame the crimes were allegedly committed.206
For context, remember the example of Sheila, who filed a com-
plaint alleging her ex-husband, Brian, was sending harassing e-mails.
If Sheila informs investigating agents that Brian sent her harassing e-
mails between January and February 2011, the warrant should au-
thorize the agents to seize only those e-mails sent from Brian to Sheila
between January and February 2011.  In such a case, failure to limit
the warrant to the known time frame would render the warrant insuf-
ficiently particular—providing for the seizure of stored e-mails and
files for which no probable cause was established.207
iii. Specifying the Offense
The particularity requirement necessitates that an e-mail seizure
be designed to target e-mails or files that could reasonably be believed
to have some connection to the alleged crime under investigation.208
While it may sometimes be difficult for the government to identify the
exact communications sought,209 it cannot have carte blanche to seize
whatever it chooses—only evidence of the criminal activity under in-
vestigation may be seized.210  As is the rule in other contexts, the gov-
where they limited searches to the “time period that the evidence suggested the
activity occurred—between 2001 and 2004”); United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d
230, 239 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to limit broad descriptive terms by relevant
dates, when such dates are available to the police, will render a warrant over-
broad.”); Abboud, 438 F.3d at 576 (holding a warrant was invalid as overbroad
where it authorized search for records from January 1996 to May 2002, but
where there was only probable cause shown for a  three–month period in 1999);
United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a warrant was
insufficiently particular when “[t]he government did not limit the scope of the
seizure to a time frame within which the suspected criminal activity took place”
and when such time frame was known by law enforcement); United States v.
Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 604 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The warrant could have been limited
to documents related to . . . a specific period of time coincident to the suspect
transaction.”); United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he
government’s investigation centered upon specific business records, enabling it to
refine the scope of the warrant by reference to particular criminal episodes, time
periods, and subject matter.  Because the government knew ‘exactly what it
needed and wanted,’ . . . there was no need for so broad a warrant.”  (citing
United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982))); United States v.
Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 542–43 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding a failure to restrict dates of
target documents violated the particularity requirement).
206. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
208. United States v. Warshak, 490 F.3d 455, 476 n.8 (6th Cir. 2007).
209. See United States v. Vanichromanee, 742 F.2d 340, 347 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding a
warrant that only authorized seizure of writings related to the conspiracy to im-
port heroin did not need to specify precise documents).
210. United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ernment should seize only those e-mails and files related to the crime
under investigation.211
Requiring warrants to specify the crime under investigation serves
a distinct objective of the warrant requirement: that searches deemed
necessary are as limited as possible.212 Berger held the particularity
requirement mandates such detail in the context of wiretapping.213
As a result, the Wiretap Act requires that a warrant to intercept com-
munications contain “a statement of the particular offense to which it
relates.”214  This provision is a “safeguard against electronic surveil-
lance that picks up more information than is strictly necessary and
consequently violates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of partic-
ular description.”215  For this reason, courts have extended this re-
quirement to the government’s use of silent video surveillance.216
In many circumstances, the seizure of all e-mails contained in an
individual’s account will uncover more information than strictly nec-
essary to further an investigation.  Identifying the specific crime to
which the sought-after stored e-mails and files relate enables law en-
forcement to reasonably ascertain and identify those communications
that are within the scope of the probable cause established.217  In con-
trast, the seizure of all electronically stored evidence of any crime in
any jurisdiction allows precisely the kind of rummaging through a
person’s e-mail account, in search of evidence of even previously un-
suspected crimes, that the Fourth Amendment proscribes.218  For this
reason, courts have required warrants to contain “sufficiently particu-
larized language,” creating “a nexus” with the crime to be investigated
and have invalidated warrants as overly broad for failing to do so.219
As such, warrants for stored e-mails and files should provide details
as to the particular offense that has been committed, is being commit-
ted, or is about to be committed, to which the sought-after communica-
tions relate.220
211. Id. (citing United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983)).
212. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
213. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(c) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
215. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1984).
216. See Freiwald, supra note 11, ¶ 54 (citing United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d
536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992)).
217. United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. Unit A Sep. 1981).
218. See Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 635 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Voss v. Gerg-
sgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1985)).
219. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996–97 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he search warrants were written
with sufficient particularity because the items listed on the warrants were quali-
fied by phrases that emphasized that the items sought were those related to child
pornography.”).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 (2nd Cir. 2010) (“The warrant
was defective in failing to link the items to be searched and seized to the sus-
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Even if the government asserts a violation of a particular federal
statute, this alone may not be a sufficient limitation on a seizure of
stored e-mails or files.221  While some federal statutes may be narrow
enough to meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement, courts have
held the mere reference to a statute that covers a broad range of crimi-
nal activity does not sufficiently limit the scope of a seizure.222  For
example, in Voss v. Bergsgaard, 223 the government established proba-
ble cause of a tax-fraud scheme.224  However, the warrant was not re-
stricted to evidence relating to tax fraud, consequently permitting the
government to seize books and records that were “evidence of viola-
tions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371,” a statute that pro-
hibits conspiracies to violate any other federal statute.225  The court
held “even if the reference to [§] 371 is construed as a limitation, it
does not constitute a constitutionally adequate particularization of the
items to be seized” because that statute itself is extremely broad in
scope and therefore placed no real limitation on the warrant.226
The court in Voss noted the dangers inherent in allowing refer-
ences to broad criminal statutes to serve as sufficient limitations that
satisfy the particularity requirement.227  The warrant allowed for “the
seizure of all books, records, or documents relating to customer ac-
counts” concerning the general federal conspiracy statute.228  The
court noted:
[E]vidence in a customer’s file indicating a conspiracy on that customer’s part
to import marijuana, even if unrelated to tax fraud, is within the scope of the
warrant and may lawfully be seized.  This, despite the fact that the govern-
ment presented no evidence even suggesting probable cause for believing a
drug crime had been committed.229
pected criminal activity . . . and thereby lacked meaningful parameters on an
otherwise limitless search of Rosa’s electronic media.”); United States v. Kow, 58
F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The government could have made the warrant
more particular.  Most obviously, the warrant could have specified the suspected
criminal conduct.”); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2nd Cir. 1986)
(“[T]he Constitution requires particularization in the warrant, i.e., the warrant
must describe . . . the crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed.”).
221. See United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The only limitation on the search and
seizure of appellants’ business papers was the requirement that they be the in-
strumentality or evidence of violation of the general tax evasion statute. . . . That
is not enough.”); United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 542–43 (1st Cir. 1980)
(holding a warrant that was limited only by reference to records and a federal
fraud statute was overbroad).
222. Leary, 846 F.2d at 601.
223. 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985).
224. Id. at 404–05.
225. Id. at 405.
226. Id. (citing United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980)).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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This same rationale should be applied to warrants for stored e-mails
and files.  For example, a warrant for stored e-mails evidencing viola-
tions of the mail-fraud statute, which makes illegal all frauds that
utilize the mail,230 would be insufficiently particular without limiting
the seizure to specific transactions or time periods.231
Again, it may be difficult for the government to identify exactly
which e-mails stored in an account are evidence of the crime under
investigation.  Thus there may be situations where seizure of all elec-
tronically stored e-mails or files may be necessary.  Yet for such lan-
guage to pass constitutional muster, the government should specify
that all of the e-mails and files relate to a narrow, criminal statute,
thereby ensuring the subsequent seizure does not extend beyond the
probable cause established.  In contrast, reference to a federal statute
encompassing a broad range of criminal activity will be permissible
only when a statutory reference is limited by the specific descriptions
of the e-mails sought.232
3. Confronting the Plain Text Argument
The proposed particularity standards will help ensure that investi-
gating agents clearly understand what it is they are seeking to seize,
consequently enabling them to conduct stored-e-mail-surveillance in a
way that avoids searching and seizing e-mails and files of types not
identified.233  However, in United States v. Grubbs,234 the Supreme
Court interpreted the particularity requirement narrowly, adding to
the list of opinions rejecting efforts to expand its scope.235  The Court
held the Fourth Amendment “does not set forth some general ‘particu-
230. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
231. See Roche, 614 F.2d at 8.  In Roche, the government had probable cause to believe
the defendant was engaged in an extensive mail fraud scheme, systematically
charging customers more for motor vehicle insurance. Id. at 7.  The government
obtained a warrant that authorized the seizure of books, records and documents
“which are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of [mail fraud].” Id.  The First
Circuit found this limitation to be “no limitation at all,” as the description did not
limit the search to documents relating to motor vehicle insurance, but authorized
the seizure of a far broader class of documents. Id. at 7–8.
232. See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Lamport, 787 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a warrant was sufficiently
specific where statutory reference to the mail-fraud statute was limited by a list
of medical records which were limited by patients and dates); cf. United States v.
Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding a warrant violated the partic-
ularity requirement because it authorized wholesale seizures of entire categories
of items which were not generally evidence of criminal activity, because it pro-
vided no guidelines to distinguish items used lawfully from those the government
had probable cause to seize, and because it referred to a statute rather than par-
ticular criminal activities themselves).
233. See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001).
234. 547 U.S. 90 (2006).
235. Id. at 97.
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larity requirement.’”236  Rather, the Amendment specifies the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized are the only mat-
ters that must be particularly described in a warrant.237
The aforementioned particularity parameters do not merely satisfy
“some general particularity requirement.”238  Courts have repeatedly
held the government’s failure to use information that further details a
warrant’s descriptions, if the government possesses or could obtain
such information at the time of warrant application, will render a
description of the items to be seized insufficient for purposes of the
particularity requirement.239  Failure to enforce the proposed parame-
ters of particularity will result in warrants that give to the executing
officers the task of determining which stored e-mails and files fall
within the unnecessarily broad categories of items to be seized.  With-
out limiting parameters, warrants fail to distinguish—or provide cri-
teria for distinguishing—target communications from innocuous
communications.  Agents permitted to seize the entirety of a target-
account will not consider their authority to be limited.240  Focusing on
the content of stored e-mails and files, identifying the parties to com-
munications, restricting searches and seizures by relevant time frame,
and recognizing a nexus between the communications sought and the
crime committed is necessary to ensure warrants for stored e-mails
are not akin to the colonial-era general warrants the particularity re-
quirement prohibits.
C. Margin of Flexibility
While the number of files that may be scrutinized is not determina-
tive, the seizure of all stored e-mails in an account is constitutionally
justified only when all of those e-mails are within the scope of the
probable cause underlying the warrant.241  Rarely would this be the
case—a target e-mail account will generally contain numerous e-mails
which are completely irrelevant to a criminal investigation.  Yet ad-
herence to the particularity requirement does not always require that
warrants be “elaborately detailed.”242  There may be instances when
the government does not have information to establish parameters
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id.; see also Paul Ohm, Response, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants,
and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 10 (2011).
239. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
240. United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 177 (1st Cir. 1987); Montilla Records of
P.R. v. Morales, 575 F.2d 324, 326 (1st Cir. 1978).
241. United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The search and
seizure of large quantities of material is justified if the material is within the
scope of the probable cause underlying the warrant.”).
242. United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1987); cf. United States v.
Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a warrant that outlined fourteen
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that limit the scope of a search and seizure, and it therefore may not
always be possible to describe the sought-after e-mails or files with the
aforementioned level of detail.
When assessing whether the level of detail is sufficiently particu-
lar, judicial officers must weigh the practical necessities of law en-
forcement against the likelihood of violating an individual’s personal
rights.243  It is almost certain that a target e-mail account will contain
stored communications both relevant and completely irrelevant to an
investigation, and magistrate judges must therefore weigh heavily the
likelihood that privacy will be violated if the aforementioned particu-
larization is not implemented in the context of stored e-mail surveil-
lance.244  A greater degree of ambiguity may be tolerated, however,
under certain circumstances.
1. Generic Descriptions When Information is Unavailable
A warrant authorizing a seizure of “any and all information and/or
data” stored in an e-mail account should presumptively fail to satisfy
the particularity requirement.245  Such a categorical description is too
broad in the sense it includes e-mails that should not be seized246—
providing the government with unrestrained access to electronic
records of one’s daily activities and private affairs.247  However, with-
out some form of examination, it may be difficult for the government
categories of business records was insufficient because “the warrant contained no
limitations on which documents within each category could be seized”).
243. United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981).
244. See United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (“The modern
development of the personal computer and its ability to store and intermingle a
huge array of one’s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement’s
ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person’s private affairs, and ac-
cordingly makes the particularity requirement that much more important.”); In
re Lafayette Acad., Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding a warrant was
insufficiently particular as it allowed seizure of nearly every book and document
on premises of school, and as it created a likelihood of intermixture between a few
“unlawful” and many “lawful” documents); United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183,
188 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding a warrant insufficient where it provided for the
seizure of unlawful pirate tapes but where those tapes were likely to be mixed
together with lawful tapes, and there was no indication of how they would be
distinguished prior to seizure).
245. See, e.g., Otero, 563 F.3d at 1132 (“[T]he government does not contest that a war-
rant authorizing a search of ‘any and all information and/or data’ stored on a
computer would be anything but the sort of wide-ranging search that fails to sat-
isfy the particularity requirement.”).
246. See United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The cases on
‘particularity’ are actually concerned with . . . whether the category as specified is
too broad in the sense that it includes items that should not be seized.”).
247. See United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2nd Cir. 2010) (holding a warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of any and all electronic equipment, digital
files, and images “lacked meaningful parameters on an otherwise limitless search
of Rosa’s electronic media”).
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to know exactly which stored e-mail or file contains the sought-after
content.248  While this difficulty may, in theory, justify blanket-
seizures of all stored e-mails and files contained in an account, the
government must demonstrate to a magistrate judge factually why a
broad search and seizure authority is reasonable; there must be some
threshold-showing before the government may “seize the haystack to
look for the needle.”249
The use of a generic term or a general description of the stored e-
mails and files, such as the “contents of all wire or electronic commu-
nications placed or entered in files controlled by the e-mail service pro-
vider,”250 might be acceptable when further detail is unavailable, and
a more precise description is impossible.251  The government must
demonstrate it did the best that could reasonably be expected under
the circumstances, acquired all the descriptive facts which a reasona-
ble investigation could uncover, and insured those facts were included
in the warrant.252  The government can demonstrate this by incorpo-
rating an affidavit by reference, explaining the government could not
reasonably describe the targeted e-mails with more specificity into a
warrant application.253  Additionally, an explanatory affidavit docu-
248. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT II), 621 F.3d 1162, 1176
(9th Cir. 2010) (“There is no way to be sure exactly what an electronic file con-
tains without somehow examining its contents—either by opening it and looking,
using specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some other such
technique.”).
249. See United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the notion
that the government “has an automatic blank check when seeking or executing
warrants in computer-related searches”).
250. A similar description was used in Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357,
2006 WL 5230332, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006). See also United States v.
Hanna, Nos. 09-1452, 09-2086, 2011 WL 3524292, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011)
(holding warrant authorized the seizure of “ ‘[a]ll stored electronic mail of any
kind sent to, from, and through [Dawn Hanna’s AOL email account], or associ-
ated with the user name Dawn Hanna or account holder Dawn Hanna, between
January 2001 and the present,’ as well as business records and traffic data for
that account”).
251. See United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 602 n.13 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Timpani, 665 F.2d 1, 45 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is difficult to see how the
search warrant could have been made significantly more precise.”); United States
v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (citing United States v.
Cortellesso, 601 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1979)); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d
782, 792 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding a warrant was as specific as circumstances
would allow).
252. United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 388, 590 (2nd Cir. 1987) (quoting United States
v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2nd Cir. 1984)).
253. See Hill, 459 F.3d at 976; United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“Generic classifications in a warrant are acceptable only when a more precise
description is not possible.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see
also United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Of course, if the
[seized] images themselves could have been easily obtained through an on-site
inspection, there might have been no justification for allowing the seizure of all
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ments the informed endorsement of the neutral, judicial officer issuing
a warrant, an endorsement which is an essential safeguard that pro-
tects the privacy interests implicated by searches and seizures.254
However, such generic descriptions should be permitted only when
those descriptions are shown to be related to an identified, specific,
and illegal activity.255  Otherwise, warrants authorizing blanket
seizures of “any and all electronic communications” stored with an ISP
would fail to satisfy the particularity requirement,256 especially when
there is no affidavit giving a reasonable explanation as to why a
wholesale seizure is necessary.257
computer equipment, a category potentially including equipment that contained
no images and had no connection to the crime.”).
254. Hill, 459 F.3d at 976–77 (“The essential safeguard required is that wholesale re-
moval must be monitored by the judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate.”
(citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1982))).
255. See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2006) (providing that a
warrant must tie the documents sought to the crimes alleged); Voss v. Gerg-
sgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Where a warrant authorizes the
seizure of particularly described records relevant to a specific crime and all of an
organization’s records, in fact, fall into that category, they may all lawfully be
seized.  However, a warrant that simply authorizes the seizure of all files,
whether or not relevant to a specified crime, is insufficiently particular.”); United
States v. Federbush, 625 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding the use of a
search warrant that described the property to be seized generically as “docu-
ments, securities, papers . . . and . . . being held in violation of United States
Code, Title 18, Section 2314” because it specified the crime and the enterprise to
which the items listed were to pertain); United States v. McDarrah, 05 CR.
1182(PAC), 2006 WL 1997638 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 80
(2010) (upholding a warrant which authorized the search of “[a]ll stored elec-
tronic mail and other stored content information presently contained in, or on
behalf of, the following electronic mail addresses: Ps41alum@aol.com” because
the affidavit extensively documented the continued use of the e-mail account in
perpetrating the alleged crime, thereby establishing probable cause to search the
entire e-mail account); see also Cook, 657 F.2d at 733 (discussing cases upholding
warrants with generic descriptions).
256. See United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding a war-
rant authorizing seizure of “any and all information and/or data” failed the par-
ticularity requirement); United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir.
2005) (holding a warrant authorizing seizure of all storage media and “not lim-
ited to any particular files” violated the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining a warrant that contained “ob-
jective limits to help officers determine which items they could seize—allowing
seizure only of documents linked to BAMSE, for example”); United States v. Fleet
Mgmt. Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443–44 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding a warrant that
authorized a seizure of “any and all data . . .  including but not limited to” a list of
items turned a computer search warrant into an unconstitutional general
warrant).
257. See Hill, 459 F.3d at 976; Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595 (“[T]he wholesale seizure for
later detailed examination of records not described in a warrant is significantly
more intrusive, and has been characterized as ‘the kind of investigatory dragnet
that the fourth amendment [sic] was designed to prevent.’” (quoting United
States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1980))).
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2. Complex Criminality
The particularity requirement must also be applied with a practi-
cal margin of flexibility, taking into account the nature of the items to
be seized258 and the complexity of the case under investigation.259  It
has long been recognized that a criminal investigation requires inves-
tigators to piece together evidence that is often circumstantial and
from multiple sources.260  The Supreme Court has recognized a com-
plex criminal investigation may require piecing together, “like a jig-
saw puzzle,” a number of evidentiary items that may not appear
incriminating when taken alone.261  Courts have justified a more flex-
ible reading of the particularity requirement and upheld warrants
permitting the seizure of all records pertaining to a certain offense
when the crimes under investigation are complex and extensive.262
This “pervasive fraud” doctrine permits an “all records” warrant
where the affidavit supporting it demonstrates a pattern of illegal con-
duct that is likely to extend beyond the conduct already in evi-
dence.263  The doctrine is concerned with the breadth of the alleged
criminality, i.e., whether evidence of criminal activity is likely to be
found in a variety of records related to a wide range of activities.264
Thus, investigations for certain types of criminal activity may per-
mit the government to deviate from its specificity obligation.  For ex-
ample, where the government establishes probable cause to believe
that an e-mail account is used almost entirely or exclusively as part of
a complex criminal endeavor, such as a pervasive scheme to defraud
258. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“It is true that a
warrant authorizing seizure of records of criminal activity permits officers to ex-
amine many papers in a suspect’s possession to determine if they are within the
described category.  But allowing some latitude in this regard simply recognizes
the reality that few people keep documents of their criminal transactions in a
folder marked ‘drug records.’”); United States v. Zanche, 541 F. Supp. 207, 210
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Unlike other forms of property, business records are often inca-
pable of being itemized one by one, particularly when their existence, but not
their precise names or quantity, is all that is known.”).
259. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 563, 481 n.10 (1976) (“Like a jigsaw
puzzle, the whole ‘picture’ of petitioner’s false-pretense scheme . . . could be
shown only by placing in the proper place the many pieces of evidence that, taken
singly, would show comparatively little.”); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d
1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The degree to which a warrant must state its terms with partic-
ularity varies inversely with [sic] complexity of the criminal activity
investigated.”).
260. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1259 (11th Cir. 2011).
261. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 481 n.10.
262. See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (10th Cir. 1997) (up-
holding seizure of “any and all records relating to the business” under investiga-
tion for mail fraud and money laundering).
263. Bradley, 644 F.3d. at 1259.
264. Id.
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or a drug conspiracy, all stored e-mail communications from the e-
mail account could potentially be subject to seizure.265  A description
of the stored e-mails to be seized might then be sufficiently particular.
If there is probable cause to believe that crime permeated the entire e-
mail account, it would not be possible through a more specific descrip-
tion to separate stored e-mails that are evidence of the crime from
those that are not.266  Such a description leaves nothing to the discre-
tion of the executing law-enforcement officers—they may seize all
stored e-mails from the account.
Imagine, for example, that Roy is under investigation for con-
ducting an “advance fee” scheme267 and uses his e-mail account to
conduct his allegedly fraudulent business.  Law-enforcement agents
submit an affidavit stating that—over the course of a two-year inves-
tigation and after speaking with multiple victims—the government
concluded Roy had defrauded over 100 victims of more than five mil-
lion aggregate dollars.  The affidavit also describes how Roy conducted
his fraudulent business via e-mail and provides extensive excerpts of
e-mails sent from Roy’s account to his victims.  Because Roy’s fraudu-
lent business was primarily or solely criminal, and because Roy used
his e-mail account as the primary e-mail account for conducting that
business, there is likely sufficient evidence to establish probable cause
that criminal activity permeated the e-mail account.268
265. See, e.g., United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A generalized
seizure of business documents may be justified if the government establishes
probable cause to believe that the entire business is merely a scheme to defraud
or that all of the business’s records are likely to evidence criminal activity.”);
United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that be-
cause the business was “permeated with fraud and . . . this fraud affected all [the
defendant’s] customers . . . the government . . . had no obligation to restrict the
search to specific documents” where the evidence supported the broad search and
seizure); United States v. Offices Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708 F.2d 1371,
1374 (9th Cir.1983), United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305–09 (1st Cir. 1980)
(upholding warrant for virtually all records of corporation where “the fraud was
so extensive as to justify a belief by the magistrate that all these documents were
likely to constitute evidence of the crimes under investigation”).
266. See United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1238 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting where the
defendant “operated a complex criminal enterprise where he mingled ‘innocent’
documents with apparently-innocent documents which, in fact, memorialized ille-
gal transactions, . . . [it] would have been difficult for the magistrate judge to be
more limiting in phrasing the warrant’s language, and for the executing officers
to have been more discerning in determining what to seize”); United States v.
Kail, 804 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1986).
267. Common Fraud Schemes, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/scams-
safety/fraud (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).  An “advance fee” scheme is a fraud
through which victims are induced to pay money to someone in anticipation of
receiving something of greater value but actually receive little or nothing in re-
turn. Id.
268. United States v. Bowen, 689 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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However, application of the “pervasive fraud” doctrine, or an exten-
sion of it, should be permissible only after investigating agents have
demonstrated probable cause to believe a specific e-mail account is
permeated with evidence of a complex crime.269  Another example is
illustrative: Imagine Dave works as a hedge fund manager at a finan-
cial firm.  While most of Dave’s business transactions have been legal,
the government believes Dave used both his work and his personal e-
mail accounts to perpetrate securities fraud.  Dave sends and receives
most of his business-related e-mails using his work e-mail address—
most of Dave’s e-mails related to both his legitimate and illegitimate
business transactions are commingled in his work e-mail account.
While the government could establish probable cause to seize all of the
e-mails stored in Dave’s work e-mail account, probable cause would
not exist to validate a seizure of all e-mails stored in Dave’s personal
e-mail account.270
V. PRACTICALITIES OF PARTICULARITY
A search for and seizure of stored e-mails and files should extend
no further than necessary to find the particular communications the
warrant describes.271  Requiring the government to provide the afore-
mentioned level of detail protects privacy interests under the Fourth
Amendment by preventing digital rummaging.272  However, the exe-
cution of a warrant for physical evidence differs greatly from the exe-
cution of a warrant for stored data such as e-mail.  Concerning the
former, the government obtains a warrant to search a particular phys-
ical space for a particular piece of evidence, the government searches
that space, and then the government seizes the evidence.273  Execut-
ing a warrant for stored e-mail, however, flips the process.  First, the
warrant directs the ISP to produce all emails from the specified ac-
count or accounts.274  After receiving a warrant, ISPs will typically
269. See, e.g., In re Solid State Devices, Inc., 130 F.3d 853, 856–57 (requiring “a more
substantial showing of pervasive fraud” where a company’s business is primarily
legitimate); In re Lafayette Acad., Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding a
seizure of all records was not justified because defendant’s business was legiti-
mate and suspected criminal activity went to only one aspect of it).
270. United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 387–89 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
271. LAFAVE, supra note 101, at 551.
272. See supra Part IV.
273. See Orin S. Kerr, Search Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 MISS. L.J. 85,
91 (2005).
274. See CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 134; Kerr, supra note
273, at 91.  The government may also subpoena the stored e-mail communica-
tions and files—ISPs ordinarily respond to such a subpoena by sending the gov-
ernment a computer disk containing the contents described in the subpoena.
Kerr, supra note 8, at 1044.  According to Kerr and others, while the government
may not need a probable cause warrant to get a copy of the contents, it would
need a warrant to access and search the contents for evidence. Id.
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copy the information onto a storage drive, or print it out, and send it to
the investigating agent.275  Second, the warrant authorizes law en-
forcement to review the stored information to identify information
that falls within the scope of the particularized items to be seized.276
The exact moment when a seizure of stored e-mails actually occurs
is currently unsettled.  However, many agree that such a seizure oc-
curs when the government copies electronically stored data.277
According to Orin Kerr, when the government makes a copy of elec-
tronic data it “adds to the information in the government’s posses-
sion . . . which the government has not observed,” constituting a
seizure.278  If copying the contents of stored e-mails amounts to a
seizure, the government seizes that content when an ISP, acting as an
agent of the government, makes a copy of the stored e-mail communi-
cations belonging to the target of the investigation.279
The stored e-mail seizure–search sequence is problematic due to a
well-established exception to the warrant requirement.  Under the
plain view exception, the government may seize evidence that is in
plain view without a warrant, provided that the government en-
counters this evidence during an authorized search and the incrimi-
nating nature of the evidence is “immediately apparent.”280 United
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT II)281 exemplifies
how the plain view exception complicates the execution of a digital
search and seizure.  In CDT II, the government obtained a warrant for
the drug-testing records of ten baseball players suspected of drug
use.282  Included in the warrant was a provision allowing the seizure
of the drug-test records and the computers that contained the off-site
examination.283  When the government executed the warrant, the gov-
ernment seized and reviewed the drug-testing records for hundreds of
players.284  Although the government only had probable cause as to
275. See United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066–68 (8th Cir. 2002).
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and
Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 39, 109
(2002); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE
L.J. 700, 714–15 (2010) (arguing that only copying of data that has not been ex-
posed to human observation by a government agent amounts to a seizure).
278. Kerr, supra note 277, at 714.
279. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.4 (1979) (holding a telephone com-
pany was an “agent” of the police when it provided the pen register and the num-
bers recorded by the telephone company, thereby rendering “installation and use
of pen register state action”).
280. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135–36 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).
281. 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
282. Id. at 1166.
283. Id. at 1168.
284. Id. at 1166.
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ten players, it uncovered incriminating evidence of other individuals
while reviewing all of the records, and it claimed that evidence was in
plain view.285
Orin Kerr’s particularity proposal—to which warrants simply
naming the individual under investigation would be considered suffi-
ciently particular—would essentially have the same effect.286  Imag-
ine the government establishes probable cause to believe Susan’s e-
mails contain evidence related to drug trafficking.  In Kerr’s view, the
particularity requirement is satisfied if the government obtains a war-
rant to seize and subsequently search the contents of all of Susan’s e-
mail accounts.287  The government serves the warrant on the various
ISPs, and the ISPs hand over the contents of Susan’s e-mail accounts
to the government.  Without further restrictions on the government,
this situation presents the same problem the Ninth Circuit confronted
in CDT II—the government can sift through a multitude of e-mails
that are beyond the scope of the probable cause it has established.288
If the government encounters incriminating evidence not related to
drug trafficking, such evidence is in plain view.
To respond to the concern that his approach may “allow the gov-
ernment to sift through too many of an individual’s communications,
exposing a suspect’s entire world of communications in plain view in a
way that threatens to seem like a general warrant,”289 Kerr proposes
the elimination of the plain view exception for online searches.290  Yet
even Kerr acknowledges that eliminating the plain view exception
would presently be too severe.291  When presented with this proposal,
members of the judiciary have argued against casting the plain view
exception aside, allowing instead the incremental development of the
contours of the plain view exception through the normal course of fact-
based case adjudication.292
There is no need to require the government to foreswear reliance
on the plain view exception in order to adhere to the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Stored e-mail warrants should describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized according to the aforementioned proposed
standards of particularity—focusing on the content of sought-after e-
mails and files.  Particularity for stored e-mail warrants ensures nar-
285. Id. at 1170.
286. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1046.
287. Id.
288. CDT II, 621 F.3d at 1170.
289. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1047–48.
290. Id. at 1048 (citing Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119
HARV. L. REV. 531, 582–84 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures]).
291. Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 290, at 583.
292. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 241 n.16 (quoting United States v. Mann,
592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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row searches and seizures, thereby limiting them to a permissible
scope and minimizing their intrusiveness.293
Where such detail is impossible and the description of the stored e-
mails and files to be searched and seized becomes more general, “the
method by which the search is executed becomes more important.”294
The “search method must be tailored to meet allowed ends,”295 avoid-
ing “transforming a limited search into a general one.”296  Yet it is
precisely the process by which warrants for stored e-mail content are
often executed that blocks adherence to the particularity requirement.
Government agents ordinarily do not search through ISP’s servers
themselves.297  Instead, the government serves a warrant on an ISP
and the ISP produces the material specified in the warrant.298  If a
warrant authorizes the search and seizure only of the certain e-mails
matching the warrant’s descriptions, ISPs become the middlemen be-
tween the government and e-mail-account holders.  On one hand, ISPs
should be the middlemen.  Requiring ISPs to segregate sought-after e-
mails that are particularly described in warrants from those e-mails
the government does not have probable cause to seize ensures consti-
tutional reasonableness—the technical expertise of ISP technicians
far outweighs that of law-enforcement officers, and the stored e-mails
are located on the ISP’s property.299
On the other hand, requiring ISPs to segregate e-mails identified
in a warrant from those not identified may be burdensome and may
create fear of liability if e-mails are improperly disclosed.  However,
this practical consideration does not counteract the constitutional re-
quirement that warrants describe sought-after e-mails with particu-
larity,300 and ISPs do have specific forms of mitigating redress.  First,
the SCA shields ISPs from liability for compliance with the terms of a
warrant that compels disclosure of stored e-mail communications.301
Second, the SCA mandates the government reimburse ISPs that it
compels to disclose stored e-mails for the costs incurred in searching,
assembling, reproducing, and providing stored e-mail communica-
293. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
294. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 134.
298. Id. (citing United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding
search of email by ISP without presence of law enforcement did not violate
Fourth Amendment)).
299. Bach, 310 F.3d at 1067 (utilizing these factors to find that the search of e-mail by
ISP without presence of law enforcement did not violate Fourth Amendment).
300. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 8, at 176 (arguing the particularity require-
ment would be satisfied if the government compels disclosure only of those stored
e-mails for which they have probable cause and service providers produce only
those e-mails and related attributes that are particularly specified).
301. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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tions.302  This includes any costs incurred if the operations of the ISP’s
servers are disrupted.303
If ISPs prove unwilling, magistrate judges should impose restric-
tions on the government’s execution of warrants for stored e-mail com-
munications.304  Mainly, examination of e-mail accounts and
segregation of the stored e-mails particularly described in the warrant
should be executed by a filter-team consisting of agents or specially-
trained computer personnel or who are not involved in the investiga-
tion.305  The filter-team should be prohibited from communicating to
the investigating agents any information gleaned from e-mails and
files not described in the warrant.306  Once the e-mails, for which the
government has probable cause to collect, have been isolated from
other e-mails stored in an account, the investigating agents should be
permitted to examine only the sought-after e-mails.307  Such a restric-
tion is necessary to prevent investigating agents from exercising un-
fettered discretion and to keep privacy intrusions to a minimum.308
This is a “hardly revolutionary” solution to the problem of necessarily
over-seizing evidence, offering the government a safe harbor to over-
302. Id. § 2706.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT II), 621 F.3d
1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2010).
305. See id. at 1172 (“[T]he representation in the warrant that computer personnel
would be used to examine and segregate the data was obviously designed to reas-
sure the issuing magistrate that the government wouldn’t sweep up large quanti-
ties of data in the hope of dredging up information it could not otherwise lawfully
seize.”).  The government can and does employ computer personnel to segregate
documents before investigating agents gain access. See, e.g., United States v. Vo-
gel, No. 4:08-CR-224(1), 2010 WL 2268237, at *7 (E.D. Tex. May 25, 2010) (“[A]
‘filter team’ was established . . . [and] members of the investigation and prosecu-
tion teams did not view or rely upon privileged documents.”).  Orin Kerr has ar-
gued that ex ante restrictions on how warrants should be executed, such as
requiring independent computer personnel to examine and segregate e-mails,
have no legal effect because magistrate judges do not have the power to limit how
warrants are executed beyond establishing the particularity of the place to be
searched and things to be seized.  Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer
Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2010).  However, he also concedes
that determining what may be seized is a core traditional function of magistrate
judges reviewing warrant applications. Id. at 1263.
306. See CDT II, 621 F.3d at 1168–69.
307. See id.; United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1982) (“In the
comparatively rare instances where documents are so intermingled that they
cannot feasibly be sorted on site, we suggest that the Government and law en-
forcement officials generally can avoid violating fourth amendment [sic] rights by
sealing and holding the documents pending approval by a magistrate of a further
search . . . . The essential safeguard required is that wholesale removal must be
monitored by the judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate.”).
308. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
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seize while simultaneously protecting privacy and property rights in
stored e-mail communications.309
Some courts are hesitant to require that warrants specify the pre-
cise search method the government will use to uncover electronic data
because limiting the government’s search methodology ex ante would
allow criminals to evade law-enforcement scrutiny by utilizing coded
terms in their files or documents.310  However, the process of segre-
gating stored e-mails that may be seized from those which may not
must not allow the government to access data which it has no probable
cause to collect.311  In many cases, utilizing a filter team will not com-
promise the government’s ability to prosecute a case.312  Additionally,
the Supreme Court in Dalia v. United States313 encouraged warrant
applications that reveal the method of execution ex ante, calling this
the “preferable approach.”314  Judicial officers alone delineate what
may be seized pursuant to the warrant and what must be ignored,
curtailing the discretion of the government in executing the war-
rant.315  It is their duty to scrupulously impose restrictions on the gov-
ernment’s electronic surveillance by tailoring authorization to conduct
it.316
There is a far greater potential “for the ‘intermingling’ of docu-
ments” and “a consequent invasion of privacy” when police execute a
309. CDT II, 621 F.3d at 1178, 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no
case law holding that an officer must justify the lack of a search protocol in order
to support issuance of the warrant.”); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246,
1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (“At the outset, we disagree with [the defendant] that the
government was required to describe its specific search methodology.”); United
States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The . . . warrant did not
prescribe methods of recovery or tests to be performed, but warrants rarely do so.
The warrant process is primarily concerned with identifying what may be
searched or seized—not how—and whether there is sufficient cause for the inva-
sion of privacy thus entailed.”).
311. CDT II, 621 F.3d at 1177.
312. See In re United States of America’s Application for a Search Warrant to Seize
and Search Electronic Devises from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1150
(W.D. Wash. 2011); CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 73, at 80
(“[P]rosecutors should oppose such restrictions whenever they significantly inter-
fere with the government’s ability to obtain evidence that falls within the scope of
the warrant.”).
313. 441 U.S. 246 (1979).
314. Ohm, supra note 238, at 3–4.
315. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (stating the particularity re-
quirement “prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.
As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant”).
316. See United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 & n.14 (10th Cir. 1971) (“In tailoring
an authorization the judge might well require, for example, early and frequent
reports in writing by the officer as to the nature and character of the intercep-
tions, whereby further specific orders could be imposed.”).
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search for electronically-stored evidence.317  Due to the intrusiveness
of searching and seizing the contents of stored e-mails and files, mag-
istrate judges should place restrictions on the execution of warrants to
ensure adherence to the Fourth Amendment.318  Requiring segrega-
tion of the sought-after communications from those which the govern-
ment has no probable cause to seize is within the power of magistrate
judges, a power to limit how warrants are executed and a power to
ensure adherence to the particularity requirement.319  Placing limits
on the execution of warrants for stored e-mails ensures the particular-
ity requirement is checked by judges, not by the police themselves.320
Without such a neutral predetermination of the scope and breadth of
stored e-mail searches and seizures, individuals are secure from
Fourth Amendment violations only at the discretion of police.321
VI. CONCLUSION
The law of electronic surveillance, as it currently stands in most
jurisdictions, permits the government to search and seize stored e-
mails and files in violation of the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.  The privacy implications of such overly broad
searches and seizures necessitate that warrants to search and seize
stored communications adhere to the Amendment’s particularity re-
quirement.  Searching and seizing stored emails pursuant to warrants
that do not describe the place to be searched and things to be seized
with particularity will result in digital rummaging.  The Fourth
Amendment requires more.  The standards set forth in this Article
guide the application of the particularity requirement to stored e-mail
surveillance and help strike the proper balance between law enforce-
ment’s need to investigate crime and the individual’s right to maintain
some semblance of privacy in the face of rapidly-advancing surveil-
lance technologies.  The Fourth Amendment demands the standards
set forth in this Article, ensuring that warrants for stored communica-
tion surveillance describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the communications to be seized—a constitutional precondition
on this method of electronic surveillance.322
317. See United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011).
318. See United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009).
319. See Kerr, supra note 305, at 1246; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
356–57 (1967) (“[The agents] were not compelled, during the conduct of the
search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court
order . . . . In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a
search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of
a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end.”).
320. Cf. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1042 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 359).
321. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
322. Cf. id.
